Finding the Proper Forum for Regulation of U.S. Greenhouse Gas Emissions: The Legal and Economic Implications of Massachusetts v. EPA by Allen, George F. & Lewis, Marlo
University of Richmond Law Review
Volume 44
Issue 3 Allen Chair Issue 2010 Article 2
3-1-2010
Finding the Proper Forum for Regulation of U.S.
Greenhouse Gas Emissions: The Legal and
Economic Implications of Massachusetts v. EPA
George F. Allen
American Energy Freedom Center
Marlo Lewis
Competitive Enterprise Institute
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.richmond.edu/lawreview
Part of the Energy and Utilities Law Commons, Environmental Law Commons, and the
Legislation Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law School Journals at UR Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in
University of Richmond Law Review by an authorized editor of UR Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact
scholarshiprepository@richmond.edu.
Recommended Citation
George F. Allen & Marlo Lewis, Finding the Proper Forum for Regulation of U.S. Greenhouse Gas Emissions: The Legal and Economic
Implications of Massachusetts v. EPA, 44 U. Rich. L. Rev. 919 (2010).
Available at: https://scholarship.richmond.edu/lawreview/vol44/iss3/2
ARTICLES
FINDING THE PROPER FORUM FOR REGULATION OF
U.S. GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS: THE LEGAL AND
ECONOMIC IMPLICATIONS OF MASSACHUSETTS V.
EPA
George F. Allen *
Marlo Lewis **
I. INTRODUCTION
Environmental and energy policy debate in recent years has fo-
cused on the regulation of greenhouse gas ("GHG") emissions, and
economic considerations have weighed prominently in the politi-
cal discourse. Most discussion about the costs of restricting emis-
sions of carbon dioxide ("CO") and other GHGs has focused on
proposed carbon cap-and-trade schemes. Both government and
private-sector economists have estimated the economic impacts of
the Kyoto Protocol,, the Lieberman-Warner Climate Security Act
of 2007,2 and the Waxman-Markey American Clean Energy and
Security Act of 2009,3 among other proposals.4 Partly because in-
* Chairman, American Energy Freedom Center. J.D., University of Virginia School
of Law; B.A., University of Virginia. George Allen served as Governor of the Common-
wealth of Virginia from 1994-1998. He also served in the United States Senate, 2001-
2007, and in the United States House of Representatives, 1991-1993.
** Senior Fellow, Competitive Enterprise Institute. Ph.D., Harvard University; B.A.,
Claremont McKenna College.
1. Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change,
Dec. 10, 1997, 37 I.L.M. 22.
2. America's Climate Security Act of 2007, S. 2191, 110th Cong. (2007).
3. American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009, H.R. 2454, 111th Cong. (2009).
4. See AM. COUNCIL FOR CAPITAL FORMATION & NAT'L ASS'N OF MFRS., ANALYSIS OF
THE WAXMAN-MARKEY BILL: "THE AMERICAN CLEAN ENERGY AND SECURITY ACT OF 2009"
(H.R. 2454) USING THE NATIONAL ENERGY MODELING SYSTEM 4, 21 (2009), available at
http://www.accf.org/media/dynamic/3/media_387.pdf (concluding that the Waxman-
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tractable uncertainties would frustrate modeling efforts, less at-
tention has been paid to the costs of litigation-driven GHG regu-
lation under the Clean Air Act ("CAA").5 Yet the economic impacts
of CAA regulation potentially far exceed those associated with
any global warming or climate change bill Congress is currently
considering.6 Moreover, GHG controls under the CAA may be un-
avoidable unless the elected members of Congress enact legisla-
tion specifically establishing parameters or preempting such reg-
ulation by an unelected bureaucracy.
7
In light of these concerns, this article addresses the manner in
which the CAA became the current conduit for the regulation of
CO 2 emissions, discussing the holding of Massachusetts v. EPA in
Part II. This part subsequently details the regulatory conse-
quences of that decision: the manner in which the U.S. Environ-
mental Protection Agency ("EPA") has addressed the mandate of
the Supreme Court, the issues involving the application of the
CAA to pollutants it was not designed to address, and the admin-
istrative and economic implications of regulating GHGs under the
existing statute. In sum, this piece demonstrates that for econom-
ic, legal, and prudential reasons, the CAA is an unsuitable in-
strument for addressing GHG emissions in the United States.
II. CARBON DIOXIDE REGULATION VIA THE CLEAN AIR ACT
AND FEDERAL COMMON LAW CAN LEAD TO ECONOMIC
DISASTER AND A CONSTITUTIONAL CRISIS
A. Massachusetts v. EPA: The Origin of U.S. Carbon Regulation
EPA's current action regarding CO 2 emissions stems directly
from Massachusetts v. EPA, wherein the Supreme Court of the
United States, by a 5-4 majority, held that GHGs are "air pollu-
Markey bill will result in significant GDP and job losses); CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, COST
ESTIMATE: H.R. 2454 AMERICAN CLEAN ENERGY AND SECURITY ACT Of 2009 10 & tbl.2
(2009) [hereinafter CBO COST ESTIMATE]; DAVID W. KREUTZER ET AL., HERITAGE FOUND.,
THE ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF WAXMAN-MAREEY: AN ANALYSIS OF THE AMERICAN
CLEAN ENERGY AND SECURITY ACT OF 2009, at 2, 12, 13 (2009), available at http://www.
heritage.orgfResearch/EnergyandEnvironment/uploadCDA_09-041.pdf (discussing why
the aforementioned analyses arrive at different results).
5. See infra Part II.B.1.
6. See CBO COST ESTIMATE, supra note 4, at 10-11; infra Part II.B.
7. See infra Part II.A.
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tants" within the meaning of the CAA, and gave EPA
three options: (1) issue a finding that GHG-related air pollution
"may reasonably be anticipated to endanger public health or wel-
fare,"9 (2) issue a finding of no endangerment, 1° or (3) provide a
"reasonable explanation" for why the agency cannot or will not
exercise its discretion to make such a determination."
Furthermore, the Supreme Court held that if EPA makes an
endangerment finding, it has an attendant obligation, pursuant
to section 202 of the CAA, to develop and implement GHG emis-
sion standards for new motor vehicles. 12
Although the Court did not require the agency to make an en-
dangerment determination, EPA-under Administrator Lisa
Jackson-issued an endangerment proposal, 3 a proposed rule es-
tablishing GHG emission standards for new motor vehicles,14 and
a proposed "Tailoring Rule" to shield small stationary sources of
CO 2 from CAA permitting requirements that Congress intended
to apply only to large industrial facilities. 5
B. The Ensuing Regulatory Cascade
In Massachusetts v. EPA, respondent EPA, citing FDA v.
Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp.,1" argued that regulating U.S.
energy use based on the carbon content of fuels or emissions was
a decision of such great "economic and political significance" that
Congress would not delegate to an administrative agency in "so
cryptic a fashion."7 Petitioners, in contrast, insisted that the case
8. 549 U.S. 497, 528-29 (2007).
9. Id. at 528, 532-33.
10. Id. at 533.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Proposed Endangerment and Cause or Contribute Findings for Greenhouse Gases
Under Section 202(a) of the Clean Air Act, 74 Fed. Reg. 18,886 (proposed Apr. 24, 2009) (to
be codified at 40 C.F.R. ch. 1).
14. Proposed Rulemaking to Establish Light-Duty Vehicle Greenhouse Gas Emission
Standards and Corporate Average Fuel Economy Standards, 74 Fed. Reg. 49,454 (pro-
posed Sept. 28, 2009) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 86 and 600).
15. Prevention of Significant Deterioration and Title V Greenhouse Gas Tailoring
Rule, 74 Fed. Reg. 55,292 (proposed Oct. 27, 2009) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 51, 52,
70, and 71) [hereinafter Tailoring Rule].
16. 529 U.S. 120 (2000).
17. Brief for the Federal Respondent at 21, Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497
(2007) (No. 05-1120); see Control of Emissions from New Highway Vehicles and Engines,
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simply concerned one subset of mobile emission sources (new mo-
tor vehicles) under one provision of the CAA, section 202.18
Beguiled by the seemingly narrow focus of the case, the Court
concluded that an endangerment finding would not lead EPA to
undertake "extreme measures," only to regulate GHG emissions
from new motor vehicles. 19 Rejecting EPA's argument that the
CAA was not intended to address GHG emissions under the
agency's authority to regulate "air pollution agent[s]," the Court
noted the broad and adaptable character of the statutory
language at issue. 0 Moreover, the Court stated, EPA would be
constrained under section 202 to give "appropriate consideration"
to compliance costs and technological feasibility. 21 The only prac-
tical consequence of a decision in favor of petitioners, the Court
suggested, would be a cost-constrained modification of new-car
fuel-economy standards .22
This assessment by the Court now seems naive. The CAA is a
highly interconnected statute. As attorney Peter Glaser docu-
mented in congressional testimony in late 2007 and early 2008,23
and as EPA's July 2008 Advanced Notice of Proposed Rulemaking
("ANPR") amply confirmed,24 once EPA starts regulating CO2 un-
der one provision of the CAA, it will have to regulate CO2 un-
der multiple provisions. 25 For example, an endangerment finding
under section 202 would provide precedent for similar findings
68 Fed. Reg. 52,922, 52,928 (Sept. 8, 2003) (quoting Brown & Williamson, 529 U.S. at
160).
18. Brief for the Petitioners at 19-20, Massachusetts, 549 U.S. 497 (2007) (No. 05-
1120).
19. Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 531.
20. Id. at 528-29.
21. Id. at 531 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 7521(a)(2) (2006)).
22. Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 7521(a)(2)).
23. Strengths and Weaknesses of Regulating Greenhouse Gas Emissions Using Exist-
ing Clean Air Act Authorities: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Energy and Air Quality of
the H. Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 110th Cong. 93, 98-99 (2008) (statement of Peter
Glaser, Partner, Troutman Sanders LLP) [hereinafter Energy and Commerce Hearing];
Massachusetts v. U.S. EPA Part II: Implications of the Supreme Court Decision: Hearing
Before the H. Select Comm. on Energy Independence and Global Warming, 110th Cong.
(2008) (statement of Peter Glaser, Partner, Troutman Sanders LLP); EPA Approval of
New Power Plants: Failure to Address Global Warming Pollutants: Hearing Before the H.
Comm. on Oversight and Gov't Reform, 110th Cong. 172, 179 (2007) (statement of Peter
Glaser and John Cline, Partners, Troutman Sanders LLP).
24. Regulating Greenhouse Gas Emissions Under the Clean Air Act, 73 Fed. Reg.
44,354, 44,432 (proposed July 30, 2008) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. ch. 1) [hereinafter
ANPRI.
25. See Energy and Commerce Hearing, supra note 23, at 99-112.
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that would either require or authorize EPA to regulate GHG
emissions from heavy-duty trucks, off-road vehicles, marine ves-
sels, aircraft, and the like under other Title II provisions. 26
1. Prevention of Significant Deterioration
The regulatory chain reaction would not be limited to mobile
sources. By definition, when EPA establishes GHG emission
standards for new motor vehicles, CO 2 becomes an air pollutant
subject to regulation under the CAA.27 As a CAA-regulated air
pollutant, CO2 would consequently be "subject to regulation" un-
der the CAA prevention of significant deterioration ("PSD") pre-
construction permitting program for stationary GHG-emitting
sources.
28
To comply with the CAA, a firm must first obtain a PSD permit
from EPA or a state environmental protection agency before con-
structing a new "major stationary [emissions] source," or modify-
ing an existing source in a manner that significantly increases
emissions. 9 A PSD source is "major" under the CAA if (1) it may
emit 100 tons per year ("tpy") of a pollutant and falls within one
of twenty-eight enumerated categories, or (2) it is any other type
of facility and has the potential to emit 250 tpy of an air pollu-
tant."o
Large industrial facilities, in the course of operation, easily
have the potential to release the threshold 250 tpy of damaging
air pollutants such as sulfur dioxide and particulate matter, but
few if any small manufacturers and no commercial or residential
facilities do.21 However, an immense number and variety
of entities-including office buildings, hotels, large retail stores,
26. See ANPR, supra note 24, at 44,432-33 (discussing the use of Title II and section
202(a) to regulate mobile sources of GHG emissions); see also id. at 44,453-58 (providing a
more detailed discussion from heavy-duty trucks); id. at 44,458-60 (discussing the use of
Title II and section 202(a) to regulate marine vessels); id. at 44,460-74 (discussing the use
of Title II and section 202(a) to regulate off-road vehicles and the engines used in various
marine vessels and aircraft).
27. See id. at 44,367 (noting that an endangerment finding under section 202(a) may
trigger further regulation of the GHG emissions from stationary sources).
28. See id.
29. See 40 C.F.R. § 52.21 (2009); see also 42 U.S.C. § 7475 (2006).
30. 40 C.F.R. § 52.21(b)(1)(i).
31. See PORTIA M.E. MILLS & MARK P. MILLS, U.S. CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, A REGU-
LATORY BURDEN: THE COMPLIANCE DIMENSION OF REGULATING CO, AS A POLLUTANT 7-10
(2008), available at http:/lwww.uschamber.com/publications/reports/0809-CO2report.pdf.
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enclosed shopping malls, small manufacturing firms, and com-
mercial kitchens-have the potential to reach 250 tpy of CO 2
emissions.3 2 A recent study conducted by the U.S. Chamber of
Commerce estimates that 1.2 million buildings and facilities-the
vast majority of which are not currently subject to PSD regula-
tion-emit at least 250 tpy of CO 2. 33 Once EPA adopts GHG emis-
sion standards, these 1.2 million entities will be vulnerable to
new regulation, potential litigation, and penalties.3 4
Firms seeking to obtain a PSD permit must determine their
course of compliance with "best available control technology"
("BACT") standards.35 Thus, each affected source typically must
undertake a complex, technical investigation.3 6 In addition to the
sometimes substantial technology investments necessary for
compliance with BACT standards, firms face the expensive and
protracted PSD permitting process. Analyzing PSD permits, EPA
estimates that each permit requires an average of 866 hours,
costs sources $125,120 on average, and represents a processing
burden of 301 hours and $23,280 for EPA or a state environmen-
tal agency.3 7 Few small businesses could operate under the PSD
administrative burden and those enterprises that did obtain a
permit would likely impose some of the additional cost on Ameri-
can consumers with higher prices.
Adopting GHG standards for new motor vehicles could also ex-
pand the magnitude and scope of the Title V operating permits
program. Sources subject to Title V must obtain a permit to oper-
ate.' An entity is a "major" emitting facility for Title V purposes
if it has the potential to emit 100 tpy of a CAA-regulated air pol-
lutant29 EPA's Tailoring Rule estimates that, once CO2 becomes a
CAA-regulated air pollutant, the number of entities subject to
32. Id. at 11-13.
33. Id. at 3-5.
34. Id. at 3.
35. See U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, NEW SOURCE REVIEW WORKSHOP MANUAL:
PREVENTION OF SIGNIFICANT DETERIORATION AND NONATTAINMENT AREA PERMITTING 4
(1990), available at http://www.epa.gov/ttn/nsr/gen/wkshpman.pdf.
36. See id. at B.1-B.74 (detailing the BACT process).
37. CARRIE WHEELER, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, INFORMATION COLLECTION
REQUEST FOR PREVENTION OF SIGNIFICANT DETERIORATION AND NONATTAINMENT NEW
SOURCE REVIEW 16-20 (2010), available at http://www.uschamber.com/assets/env/sup
portingreport.pdf.
38. See ANPR, supra note 24, at 44,377.
39. See Tailoring Rule, supra note 15, at 55,298.
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Title V regulation will expand from roughly 14,700 to 6.1 million
sources .0
Generally, the Title V program is designed to facilitate com-
pliance with other programs by consolidating all of an entity's
CAA requirements in a single permit, not to create new obliga-
tions for affected sources.41 However, if 6.1 million entities become
major emitting facilities because they emit 100 tpy of CO, nearly
98% of all entities requiring Title V permits will not have any
other CAA obligations on which to report.42 Furthermore, these
entities would be required to pay emission fees in aid of the Title
V administrative costs.43 Fees are currently assessed at $43.75
per ton of emissions,- but EPA may reduce this amount for
smaller entities.
45
Under PSD, permitting agencies are to conduct BACT determi-
nations on a "case-by-case" basis 46 and hold a "public hearing" on
the air quality impact of each source and its proposed technology
controls.47 Under Title V, agencies are to provide for public com-
ment on permit applications,' and "any person" may petition
EPA to challenge the legality of an approved permit. 49 Scenarios
are easily imagined in which these provisions empower activists
to block or delay new construction and investment. More critical-
ly, as discussed below, the sheer volume of permit applications
would overload and crash EPA and state permitting programs,
slamming the brakes on development, investment, and jobs.5°
2. NAAQS: Is 350 the New 450?
Petitioners in Massachusetts v. EPA claimed the case dealt
solely with emissions from new motor vehicles, arguing, for ex-
ample, that "[tihe NAAQS [National Ambient Air Quality Stan-
40. See id. at 55,316.
41. See id. at 55,298.
42. See id. at 55,316.
43. See 42 U.S.C. § 7661a(b) (2006).
44. See Tailoring Rule, supra note 15, at 55,346.
45. 42 U.S.C. § 7661f(f).
46. Id. § 7479(3).
47. Id. § 7475(a)(2).
48. See id. § 7661a(b)(6).
49. Id. § 766la(b)(6)-(7).
50. See Tailoring Rule, supra note 15, at 55,308.
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dards] program is an entirely separate program from the mobile
source program at issue in this case."51 That was an incorrect as-
sertion.
As aforesaid, GHG regulation of motor vehicles would trigger
PSD regulation of C0 2, and PSD is an essential adjunct of the
NAAQS program.5 The basic purpose of the PSD program is
to prevent "significant deterioration" of air quality in areas that
must comply with NAAQS.53
More importantly, the endangerment finding prerequisite to
establishing GHG emissions standards for new motor ve-
hicles would set a precedent for similar endangerment findings
under other CAA provisions, including section 108, which governs
the first phase of NAAQS rulemaking.54
CAA section 108 requires EPA to establish NAAQS if emissions
of an air pollutant from "numerous or diverse mobile or statio-
nary sources" cause or contribute to "air pollution which may rea-
sonably be anticipated to endanger public health or welfare." 55
New motor vehicles-the emission sources at issue in Massachu-
setts v. EPA-obviously qualify as numerous mobile sources for
purposes of section 108.56 In addition, EPA's endangerment find-
ing asserts that "elevated concentrations" of GHG emissions in
the atmosphere endanger public health and welfare. 51 In this con-
text, "elevated" means higher than pre-industrial concentrations,
and thus includes present-day GHG concentrations.58 EPA has al-
ready made the substantive case for economy-wide GHG regula-
tion under the NAAQS program.
NAAQS is an allowable pollution concentration standard. It de-
termines how many parts per million ("ppm") of a targeted pollu-
51. Brief for the Petitioners, supra note 18, at 28.
52. See 42 U.S.C. § 7470(1).
53. See id. § 7470(4).
54. Id. § 7408.
55. Id. § 7408(a)(1)(A)-(B).
56. See Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 505 (considering "whether EPA has the statutory
authority to regulate greenhouse gas emissions from new motor vehicles"); see also 42
U.S.C. § 7408(a)(1) (describing when EPA is required to establish NAAQS).
57. Endangerment and Cause or Contribute Findings for Greenhouse Gases Under
Section 202(a) of the Clean Air Act, 74 Fed. Reg. 66,496, 66,516 (Dec. 15, 2009) (to be codi-
fied at 40 C.F.R. ch. 1).
58. See id. at 66,517.
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tant are permissible in the ambient air.59 Petitioners in Massa-
chusetts v. EPA asserted that current GHG levels currently harm
public health and welfare.6 0 Similarly, several endangerment peti-
tions filed since Massachusetts v. EPA (to regulate GHG emis-
sions from aircraft, marine vessels, off-road engines, and heavy-
duty trucks) claim that GHG emissions already harm public
health and welfare. 61 Numerous environmental organizations and
activists now argue that climate policy in general and NAAQS
regulation in particular should aim to lower CO2 concentrations
from today's level (roughly 387 ppm) to 350 ppm by 2050.62 In De-
cember 2009 two environmental groups, the Center for Biological
Diversity and 350.org, petitioned EPA to establish NAAQS for
GHGs, including NAAQS for CO2 set at 350 ppm. 63
Attaining a CO 2 NAAQS set at 350 ppm would require "ex-
treme measures."" Even stabilization at 450 ppm may not be at-
tainable at an acceptable cost, as Newsweek reporter Sharon Beg-
ley learned when she interviewed Cal Tech chemist Nathan
Lewis:
Lewis's numbers show the enormous challenge we face. The world
used 14 trillion watts (14 terawatts) of power in 2006. Assuming
minimal population growth (to 9 billion people), slow economic
growth (1.6 percent a year, practically recession level) and-this is
key-unprecedented energy efficiency (improvements of 500 percent
relative to current U.S. levels, worldwide), it will use 28 terawatts in
2050. (In a business-as-usual scenario, we would need 45 terawatts.)
Simple physics shows that in order to keep CO, to 450 ppm, 26.5 of
those terawatts must be zero-carbon. That's a lot of solar, wind,
hydro, biofuels and nuclear, especially since renewables kicked in a
measly 0.2 terawatts in 2006 and nuclear provided 0.9 terawatts.
Are you a fan of nuclear? To get 10 terawatts, less than half of what
we'll need in 2050, Lewis calculates, we'd have to build 10,000
59. See, e.g., 40 C.F.R. § 50.4 (2009) (setting the national primary ambient air quality
standards for sulfur oxides at 0.030 ppm); id. § 50.11 (setting the national primary am-
bient air quality standards for nitrogen dioxide at 0.053 ppm).
60. 549 U.S. at 521, 525.
61. See ANPR, supra note 24, at 44,399.
62. The Center for Biological Diversity, for example, heads a "350 or Bust" coalition.
See Center for Biological Diversity, 350 or Bust, http://www.biologicaldiversity.org/pro
grams/climatejlawinstitute/350or bust/index.html (last visited Feb. 25, 2010).
63. Center for Biological Diversity & 350.org, Petition to Establish National Pollution
Limits for Greenhouse Gases Pursuant to the Clean Air Act, at i, 19-24 (Dec. 2, 2009),
available at http://www.biologicaldiversity.org/programs/climate-law-institute/global-war
minglitigationlclean air act/pdfs/PetitionGHG~pollutionscap_12-2-2009.pdf.
64. This is exactly what the Court in Massachusetts v. EPA thought would not hap-
pen. 549 U.S. at 531.
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reactors, or one every other day starting now. Do you like wind? If
you use every single breeze that blows on land, you'll get 10 or 15
terawatts. Since it's impossible to capture all the wind, a more
realistic number is 3 terawatts, or 1 million state-of-the art [sic]
turbines, and even that requires storing the energy-something we
don't know how to do-for when the wind doesn't blow. Solar? To get
10 terawatts by 2050, Lewis calculates, we'd need to cover 1 million
roofs with panels every day from now until then. "It would take an
army," he says. Obama promised green jobs, but still.65
Note also that under the CAA, regulated entities cannot wait un-
til 2050 to attain a NAAQS for C0 2.66 Rather, all areas in non-
attainment with a "primary" or health-based NAAQS must come
into attainment within five years, or at most ten years if EPA
grants an extension.67 Because GHGs tend to be long-lived in the
global atmosphere, even if the entire world somehow magically
reduced annual emissions to 1957 levels (67% below 2002 levels),
global CO 2 concentrations would still increase to 455 ppm by
2100.68 Even a complete collapse of the global economy may not be
enough to lower CO 2 concentrations to 350 ppm in ten years.
6 1
Under such a scenario, one consequence of the nation's non-
attainment with NAAQS for CO 2 is that EPA would be required
to regulate major stationary CO 2 sources pursuant to the Non-
Attainment New Source Review ("NNSR") pre-construction per-
mitting program, a regime more restrictive than PSD. 70 Regula-
65. Sharon Begley, We Can't Get There from Here; Political Will and a Price on C02
Won't Be Enough To Bring About Low-Carbon Energy Sources, NEWSWEEK, Mar. 14, 2009,
at 48.
66. See 42 U.S.C. § 7514a (2006).
67. Id. § 7502(a)(2)(A).
68. See World Climate Report, Dialing in Your Own Climate (April 10, 2006), http:/!
www.worldclimatereport.com/index.php/2006/04/10/dialing-in-your-own-climate/ (offering
tables and examples that predict global CO, concentrations in relation to annual emis-
sions).
69. See TALLBERG Found., Isn't 350 PPM Simply Unworkable?, http://tallbergfound
ation.org/Default.aspx?tabid=463 (last visited Feb. 25, 2010) (illustrating atmospheric CO,
decay and the difficulty in phasing out coal use). But see, e.g., FRANK ACKERMAN ET AL.,
ECONS. FOR EQUITY & ENV'T, THE ECONOMICS OF 350: THE BENEFITS AND COSTS OF
CLIMATE STABILIZATION 2, 5-6, 21 (2009). Both of these sources discuss the goal of reach-
ing 350 ppm by 2050.
70. See Annise Katherine Maguire, Permitting Under the Clean Air Act: How Current
Standards Impose Obstacles to Achieving Environmental Justice, 14 MICH. J. RACE & L.
255, 266 (2009). Compare U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, NONATTAINMENT NSR BASIC
INFORMATION (2009), available at http://www.epa.gov/nsr/naa.hmtl (explaining how nonat-
tainment NSR requirements are customized for each nonattainment area and require ba-
sic minimums), with 42 U.S.C. § 7475 (setting forth preconstruction requirements for
PSA).
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tion of major sources subject to NNSR begins at 100 tpy, not the
250 tpy threshold that would apply to most CO 2 sources regulated
under the PSD program. 71 NNSR-regulated entities must comply
with Lowest Achievable Emission Rate standards, which are
more stringent than BACT because EPA may not take compliance
costs into account.72 Moreover, major sources would have to "off-
set" any emissions increase from a new or modified source by re-
ducing emissions from an existing source somewhere else. 73 Ergo,
no facilities could be built or expanded anywhere in the nation
unless something else shuts down. NNSR would become a de fac-
to moratorium on growth, investment, and jobs.
Although states may take costs into account when developing
their plans to implement NAAQS, EPA is prohibited from consi-
dering costs when setting NAAQS.7 4 Initiate a rulemaking to es-
tablish primary (health-based) NAAQS for GHG emissions, and
there is, in principle, no limit to the job and GDP losses that EPA,
litigators, and courts could impose on the U.S. economy.
3. EPA's Tailoring Rule Quagmire
In the July 2008 ANPR, EPA estimated that if CO2 becomes a
CAA-regulated air pollutant, PSD permit applications would in-
crease by an "order of magnitude"-from 200-300 to 2000-3000
per year-and Title V permit applications could increase from
15,000 to 550,000 per year.75 EPA warned that even a ten-fold in-
crease in applications for PSD permits could "overwhelm permit-
ting authorities," creating an administrative logjam and atten-
dant uncertainties that would delay numerous projects. 6
EPA's October 2009 Tailoring Rule reveals that the actual
threat to economic development is much greater: "If PSD and title
V requirements apply [to CO2] at the applicability levels provided
under the CAA, State permitting authorities would be paralyzed
by permit applications in numbers that are orders of magnitude
71. See 42 U.S.C. § 7479(1); 40 C.F.R. § 52.21 (2009); see also Tailoring Rule, supra
note 15, at 55,292.
72. See 42 U.S.C. § 7501(3); Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass'ns, Inc., 531 U.S. 457, 465,
486 (2001).
73. 42 U.S.C. § 7503(c).
74. See Whitman, 531 U.S. at 465, 486.
75. ANPR, supra note 24, at 44,499, 44,511.
76. Id. at 44,507 (emphasis added).
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greater than their current administrative resources could ac-
commodate."77 EPA now estimates that PSD permit applications
could jump from roughly 300 to 41,000 per year-more than a
140-fold increase. 8 In addition, Title V permit applications would
grow from 15,000 to 6.1 million per year-a 400-fold increase.79
The "enormous numbers of these permit applications" would
"vastly exceed the current administrative resources of the permit-
ting authorities."80
Assuming that the average new Title V permit for commercial
or residential CO 2 sources would require permitting agencies
43 hours to process, or 10% of the time needed for the average in-
dustrial permit, EPA estimates that the "total nationwide addi-
tional burden for permitting authorities for title V permits from
adding GHG emissions at the 100-tpy threshold would be 340
million hours, which would cost over $15 billion."8' Note that
permitting agencies would be spending all that time and money
to process the permits of applicants who have essentially nothing
to report, because they have no other obligations under the CAA.
A more egregious case of government waste would be hard to find.
C. Absurd Results
In the Tailoring Rule, EPA proposes to suspend, over a six-year
period, the PSD and Title V requirements for GHG sources emit-
ting less than 25,000 tpy, on a CO2-equivalent basis.82 EPA will
subsequently develop "streamlining" options enabling compliance
for progressively smaller sources. 3 Presumably, EPA will also
lobby Congress for bigger budgets to increase staff and other ad-
ministrative resources.
An obvious question arises: Under what authority may EPA
deviate so blatantly from the text of the statute? In Chevron
U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, the Supreme
Court held that administrative agencies have considerable discre-
tion to interpret statutes where the text is "silent or ambiguous
77. Tailoring Rule, supra note 15, at 55,292.
78. Id. at 55,301.
79. Id. at 55,295, 55,304.
80. Id. at 55,294.
81. Id. at 55,302.
82. Id. at 55,292.
83. See id. at 55,296.
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with respect to the specific issue."8 However, there is nothing
ambiguous about the 250 tpy standard already established under
the Clean Air Act.
Although the Tailoring Rule does not present it this way, EPA
is proposing to amend the CAA, since nothing in the Act autho-
rizes EPA to dilute ("streamline"), much less suspend, specific
statutory requirements.8 5 EPA repeatedly asserts that it must de-
part from a "literal" application of the PSD and Title V regulatory
thresholds.86 But "literal" is just a euphemism for "legal" or "law-
ful." To justify this assumption or usurpation of legislative power,
EPA invokes the judicial doctrines of "absurd results" and "ad-
ministrative necessity."87
EPA argues that applying the law as written to CO2 sources
would produce two kinds of absurd results. First, EPA would be
forced to violate other statutory requirements. Specifically, CAA
section 165(c) requires that the permitting authority grant or de-
ny any completed permit application for a major emitting facility
not later than one year after the date of filing the application. 8 "A
literal interpretation of CAA sections 165(a)(1) and 169(1) to ap-
ply at the 100/250 tpy levels for GHG sources would render com-
pliance with this provision impossible by requiring far more per-
mit applications than permitting authorities could process under
this 12-month deadline ... ."19 Similarly, a literal application of
the Title V 100 tpy threshold in CAA sections 502(a), 501(2)(B),
and 302(j) would clash with CAA section 503(c), which imposes a
time limit of 18 months after a permit application is filed for
permitting authorities to issue or deny the permit. 0 "It would be
flatly impossible for permitting authorities to meet this statutory
requirement if their workload increases from some 14,000 per-
mits to 6.1 million. Instead, permit applications would face multi-
year delays in obtaining their permits. 91
84. 467 U.S. 837,843 (1984).
85. See Tailoring Rule, supra note 15, at 55,294.
86. Id. at 55,295.
87. Id.
88. 42 U.S.C. § 7475(c) (2006).
89. Tailoring Rule, supra note 15, at 55,308.
90. See id. at 55,310 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 7661b(c)).
91. Id. at 55,310.
2010]
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
Literal and thus lawful application of PSD and Title V re-
quirements to CO 2 would also be "absurd" in the sense that the
consequences would demonstrably conflict with congressional in-
tent under the CAA. The Tailoring Rule provides several exam-
ples. First, the PSD program is supposed to "insure that economic
growth will occur," albeit "in a manner consistent with the pre-
servation of existing clean air resources."92 However, because PSD
is a preconstruction requirement,
increasing permitting authorities' workload from 300 to 41,000 per-
mits would severely undermine this purpose of facilitating economic
growth .... Each year, many thousands of sources would face multi-
year delays in receiving their permits, and as a result, for all prac-
tical purposes, they would be forced to place on hold indefinitely
their plans to construct or modify.93
Further, Congress designed PSD to apply to large industrial fa-
cilities, "'which, due to their size, are financially able to bear the
substantial regulatory costs imposed by the PSD provisions and
which, as a group, are primarily responsible for emissions of the
deleterious pollutants that befoul our nation's air.' 94 Congress
wanted to exclude small entities from PSD regulation. 95 Congress
intended through Title V to improve CAA compliance by consoli-
dating all of an entity's CAA requirements into a single permit. 96
However, the vast majority of the 6.1 million CO 2 sources that
would have to apply for Title V permits have no existing CAA re-
quirements. 97 Compelling them to apply for operating permits
"would not improve compliance."98
In fact, compliance would be undermined. Many sources that
Congress did intend for EPA to regulate would not be regulated
due to the enormous backlogs resulting from the application of
PSD and Title V to a myriad of sources .Congress did not intend
for EPA to regulate."
It is beyond question that applying current CAA permitting
programs to C0 2 -the inevitable outcome of establishing GHG
92. 42 U.S.C. § 7470(3).
93. Tailoring Rule, supra note 15, at 55,308.
94. Id. (quoting Ala. Power Co. v. Costle, 636 F.2d 323, 353 (D.C. Cir. 1980)).
95. Id. at 55,308-09.
96. See id. at 55,298.
97. See id. at 55,316.
98. Id. at 55,311.
99. See id.
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standards for new motor vehicles-would produce absurd results.
However, the source of this problem is largely ignored: Massa-
chusetts v. EPA.
EPA is entirely correct: Congress did not intend to apply PSD
and Title V to small entities, did not intend for those programs to
crash under their own weight, and did not intend for PSD to stifle
economic growth. 100 And Congress never intended for EPA to con-
trol CO 2 emissions under the CAA! 1°1 Congressional support for
regulatory climate policy is much stronger today than it was in
1970 and 1977, when Congress enacted and amended CAA sec-
tion 202.102 Yet even today, the prospects for cap-and-trade legis-
lation and for U.S. ratification of a successor treaty to the Kyoto
Protocol remain in doubt.10 3 The notion that Congress, in 1970 or
1977, implicitly authorized EPA to adopt economy-wide, or even
industry-specific, controls on CO 2 is ludicrously unfounded.0 4
Only once has Congress directed EPA to regulate based on the
carbon content of the regulated activity-the renewable fuel
standard ("RFS") established by the Energy Independence and
Security Act of 2007 ("EISA"). 0 5 Enacted months after Massachu-
setts v. EPA was decided, RFS mandates the sale of renewable fu-
els, which must achieve specified percentage reductions in GHG
emissions, based on a life-cycle analysis, compared to petroleum-
based fuels. 10 6 However, EISA section 210(b)(12) makes clear that
100. See id. at 55,308.
101. See, e.g., id.
102. See, e.g., Jonathan H. Adler, Warming Up to Climate Change Litigation, 93 VA. L.
REV. IN BRIEF 63, 74 (2007) ("As this is being written, the wheels of federal climate regu-
lation are already in motion."); Scott H. Segal, Be Cool! Staying Open Minded About Cli-
mate Policy Development, 18 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POLy F. 307, 307 (2008). For a brief over-
view of bills making their way through Congress, see generally New Democratic Leaders
Call for Tough Climate-Change Legislation, ISSUES IN SCI. & TECH., at 23-24 (2007), avail-
able at http://www.issues.org/23.3/hill.html (last visited Feb. 25, 2010).
103. See, e.g., Darren Samuelsohn, Sen.-Elect Brown's Win Adds More Question Marks
to Senate Climate Debate, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 20, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/cwire/2010/
01/20/20climatewire-sen-elect-browns-win-adds-more-question-mark-48190.html.
104. See supra Part II.C.
105. Pub. L. No. 110-140, § 202, 121 Stat. 1492, 1521-22 (codified in scattered sections
of 42 U.S.C.); see BRENT D. YACOBUCCI & KELSI S. BRACMART, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH
SERVICE CALCULATION OF LIFECYCLE GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS FOR THE RENEWABLE
FUEL STANDARD 1 (2009), available at http://ncseonline.org/NLE/CRSreports/09JulyfR404
60.pdf.
106. § 202, 121 Stat. at 1524-25 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 7545(o)(4)); see Regulato-
ry Announcement, U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency Fact Sheet: EPA Proposes New Regulations
for the National Renewable Fuels Standards Program for 2010 and Beyond (May 26,
2009), available at http://www.epa.gov/OMS/.
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RFS does not establish precedent for any additional regulation of
CO 2 under other CAA provisions: "Nothing in this subsection, or
regulations issued pursuant to this subsection, shall affect or be
construed to affect the regulatory status of carbon dioxide or any
other greenhouse gas ... for purposes of other provisions (includ-
ing section 7475) of this chapter."10 7
III. CONCLUSION
Perhaps it is too much to expect an administrative agency to
question a court decision that dramatically expands the scale and
scope of its power. Nonetheless, the Supreme Court of the United
States is not infallible, and the Tailoring Rule abundantly con-
firms that Massachusetts v. EPA set the stage for economic disas-
ter.
When a court decision leads to absurd results, there are but
two possibilities: (1) the statute was badly drafted, and the court
brought the inherent conflicts to light, or (2) the court conjured
up the absurd results by misreading the statute.
The absurd results the Tailoring Rule aims to avoid are entire-
ly a product of Massachusetts v. EPA. The real issue in the case,
which the Court never faced, was whether Congress, when it
enacted and amended CAA section 202, intended for EPA to apply
the Act as a whole, including PSD and Title V and the NAAQS
program, to CO2 for the purpose of mitigating global warming. To
ask that question is to answer it.
That the Tailoring Rule will survive judicial challenge is doubt-
ful, because it so obviously flouts unambiguous statutory lan-
guage. Even if it survives, it will not protect the U.S. economy
from the regulatory fallout of Massachusetts v. EPA. As noted, lit-
igation groups have already petitioned EPA to set NAAQS for
GHG emissions at 350 ppm.08 What will EPA do when the
NAAQS lawsuits start? Will it propose another "tailoring rule" to
re-imagine the NAAQS compliance deadline as 50 or 100 years
instead of 5 or 10?
107. 42 U.S.C. § 7545(o)(12) (Supp. 1 2009).
108. Nathan Richardson, Regulating GHGs: Can the EPA Dodge a Train?, WEATHER-
VANE, http://www.rff.org/wv/archive/2009/12/07/regulating-ghgs-can-the-epa-dodge-two-tra
ins.aspx (last visited Feb. 25, 2010).
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Our constitutional system works only when each branch of
government responsibly exercises and jealously guards its own
institutional prerogatives. Many in Congress, however, ap-
plauded Massachusetts v. EPA, viewing it as way to "enact" CO 2
controls without having to vote for such measures or take respon-
sibility for their costs. 10 9 Such ceding of legislative power to non-
elected litigators, judges, and bureaucrats endangers self-
government and representative democracy.
The irony is that Massachusetts v. EPA could eventually burn
those who welcomed it as a politically expedient way to end-run
the legislative process. Blame for the economically-crippling ef-
fects of a PSD administrative nightmare and/or NAAQS regula-
tion of CO 2 would fall directly on the current presidential admin-
istration, with the majority in Congress also taking heat from the
backlash.
There will be several legislative remedies to thwart this abdi-
cation of congressional responsibility. The most prominent to date
are bills introduced by Sen. Lisa Murkowski (R-AK) and Rep.
Marsha Blackburn (R-TN). Sen. Murkowski has introduced a bi-
partisan resolution of disapproval, pursuant to the Congressional
Review Act,110 to veto the legal force and effect of EPA's endan-
germent finding."' This one-sentence bill has 40 co-sponsors." 2
Rep. Blackburn's H.R. 391 would would amend CAA section
302(g) by adding the following: "The term 'air pollutant' shall not
include carbon dioxide, water vapor, methane, nitrous oxide, hy-
drofluorocarbons, perfluorocarbons, or sulfur hexafluoride."113 The
bill also provides: "Nothing in the Clean Air Act shall be treated
as authorizing or requiring the regulation of climate change or
global warming."" ' This two-sentence bill now has 152 co-
sponsors.' 5 If enacted, either the Murkowski or Blackburn bill
would protect the U.S. economy and reassert Congress's respon-
sibility for national policymaking.
109. See, e.g., Energy and Commerce Hearing, supra note 23, at 1-2 (statement of G.K.
Butterfield, Vice Chairman, H. Subcomm. on Energy and Air Quality).
110. 5 U.S.C. §§ 801-08 (2006).
111. S.J. Res. 26, 111th Cong. (2010).
112. For a listing of co-sponsors to S.J. Res. 26, visit http://www.thomas.gov (search
"Bill Summary & Status" for "S.J. Res. 26," then follow "Cosponsors" hyperlink).
113. H.R. 391, 111th Cong. (2009).
114. Id.
115. For a listing of co-sponsors to H.R. 391, visit http://www.thomas.gov (search "Bill
Summary & Status" for "H.R. 391," then follow "Cosponsors" hyperlink).
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